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Hichilema and Another v Lungu and Another
(2016/CC/0031)[2016] ZMCC 4 (5 September 2016)
Minority Judgement
Dunia P. Zongwe
On September 5th 2016, there was tension in the packed Constitutional
Court. Three out of five Constitutional Court judges (i.e., Anne MwewaSitali, Mugeni Mulenga and Palan Mulonda) dismissed the election
petition of Presidential candidate Hakainde Hichilema and his running
mate Geoffrey Mwamba, on the grounds that the time for hearing the
petition had lapsed.The President of the Court Justice Hildah Chibomba,
and Justice Margaret Munalula dissented.
Dividing the Court was the interpretation and effect of Articles 101(5)
and 103(2) of the Constitution of Zambia. Articles 101 (5) and 103 (2)
provide that the Constitutional Court must hear a Presidential election
petition within 14 days of the filing of the petition. The Constitution is
silent as to what happens when the hearing of a petition exceeds the 14day period. While the majority of the Court dismissed the petition on
the grounds that the 14-day period had elapsed, the minority dissented,
and held that maintaining the time frame was unworkable, and that the
petitioners had a right to be, and therefore should have been, heard.
This comment discusses the dissenting opinion of the judgment. It
focuses primarily on Justice Munalula’s dissent since Justice Chibomba’s
judgement largely echoed Justice Munalaula’s dissenting opinion.
The dissent
According to Justice Munalula, the decision of the majority was based on
a literal construction of Articles 101(5) and 103(2) of the Constitution of
Zambia. In short, whereas the majority of the Court interpreted Article
101(5) strictly, the minority did not believe that a proper interpretation
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of the article was to deny the petitioners the right to a hearing once the
14 days had expired.
Justice Munalula advocated the construction of the Constitution as a
whole and held that the issue of a Presidential election petition was too
important to be left to a mechanical interpretation of article 105 and
103. Justice Munalula began her judgment by stating that while the
common and ordinary meaning of the actual words used is the starting
point in the construction of a constitutional provision, an “unrelieved
focus” on the words “within fourteen days of the filing of the petition”
cannot yield a correct answer to the question at hand. She insisted that
a literal interpretation of Articles 101(5) and 103(2) entails interpreting
the provisions in isolation from the rest of the Constitution.
Furthermore, she considered two aspects of the Constitution as relevant
to the interpretation at hand: first, the issue of implied powers and
second, the Bill of Rights. Article 271 of the Constitution provides for
implied powers while article 267 provides for an interpretation of the
Constitution in line with the Bill of Rights. Justice Munalula held that
under Article 271 of the Constitution, the Court enjoys implied powers
to interpret Article 101(5) liberally. She then reminded the Court that
Article 261, read with Article 9, imposes the obligation on the Court to
interpret the Constitution in a manner that is consonant with the Bill of
Rights and the values and principles of the Constitution. National unity
and democracy are two such values. She further pointed out that Article
118 provides that judicial authority emanates from the people and that
the courts must apply that power “without undue regard to procedural
technicalities”, and in a manner that promotes accountability.
Munalula also noted that, when conceiving the 14-day requirement, the
authors of the Zambian Constitution had in mind the “endemic delays”
that had characterized previous Presidential election petitions making
“a mockery of the process”. The framers of the constitution sought to
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balance the need for a speedy resolution of election petitions against
the need to actually have a hearing. She pointed out further that the
primary purpose of setting a time limit is to enable the Court to hear
and determine a petition without undue delay as well as make one of the
specified pronouncements based on a solid finding of both fact and law.
If the process of hearing the petition is not completed she reasoned, the
purpose of the 14-day requirement is frustrated. In her view, complying
with the 14-day deadline without the intended event having been achieved
results in an absurdity. Justice Munalula concluded that the Court would
have best served the nation by allowing a full hearing rather than relying
on a technicality to deny a hearing.
Analysis
The 14-Day Time Frame
Both dissenting opinions agreed that the time frame for hearing
Presidential petitions, as provided for in the Constitution, was not
practical. Justice Munalula wondered if such a time frame is ‘feasible’
at all. The expectation that, within that strict time frame, pleadings
and other pre-trial process would be exchanged, witnesses heard, and
judgment handed down appeared unrealistic to both dissenting justices.
Justice Munalula pointed out that, as soon as the order to hear witnesses
and evidence was given on September 2nd 2016, the petitioners should
have moved for an interpretation of Article 101(5). She lamented their
failure to do so. However it appears that interpretation of the 14-day
requirement was not the real issue. The real issue was whether 14 days
was sufficient for the petitioners to present their case thus satisfying
their right to be heard. This is less a question of interpretation than
one of fact. It is not conclusively clear whether 14 days are sufficient
or not. The 2013 Presidential election petition in Kenya suggests that,
with certain adjustments to court procedures, complying with a 14-day
time frame is possible. However in looking at the Kenyan example, one
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must remember that in order for the court to comply with the 14-day
requirement, it dispensed with hearing witnesses and restricted itself to
affidavit evidence only. Additionally, while it gave its ruling within 14
days, it gave the reasons for the ruling later. These are drastic measures
for a court to take, and it is not clear that complying with a time frame
always justifies the imposition of such measures.
Incisively, Justice Munalula held that contrary to the claim of the majority,
the hands of the Court were not tied. This is because Article 118(2)(e)
of the Zambian Constitution allows the Court to override procedural
technicalities. Surely, a Constitutional court ought to have the power to
interpret the Constitution broadly and avoid “the austerity of tabulated
legalism”, she reasoned. A constitutional court cannot be a prisoner to
the text of the constitution it is tasked to interpret, and much less a slave
of its procedural rules.
However, even though the Court did not expressly couch it in those
terms, it emerges from both the majority and minority judgment that
the outcome of the petition was heavily influenced by the failure on the
part of the petitioners to avail themselves of the time, however short, and
the opportunity they were given to make their case. The Court seems to
be saying that, even if there had been more time, the petitioners’ lawyers
were not keen on using that time productively.
The lawyers’ conduct
At first blush, the conduct of the petitioners’ lawyers appears erratic and
self-defeatist. If there is a point on which the entire Constitutional Court
agreed, it was without a doubt, in the condemnation of the strange and
ostensibly self-defeating behaviour of the petitioners’ lawyers in the case.
On September 2nd, the petitioners’ lawyers lodged several motions that
took most of the day. The court dismissed the motions. By early evening,
it was clear to the Court that the petitioners’ lawyers had no intention of
calling witnesses. The Court announced that only four hours remained
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of the 14-day time frame. The court asked the petitioners’ lawyers to
proceed. Rather than proceed, the petitioners’ lawyers withdrew from the
case on the grounds that they were not able to present their case in the
remaining 4 hours. At this point, the petitioners, representing themselves
in person, asked the Court for additional time to find new lawyers to
represent them. The Court obliged.
But what may initially appear as erratic behaviour on the part of the
petitioners’ lawyers, must be understood in the context of the Court’s
own conduct.
The Court’s own conduct
On September 2, the day that was supposedly to be the first day of the
hearing, the Court stressed that the 14-day period was rigid and that the
hearing had to be concluded on the same day around 23h45, and that
the available hours that remained would be shared equally between the
petitioners and the respondents. Later that same night, the full bench of
the Constitutional Court would tell the parties to the electoral disputes
that they would have two days each to present their case, and that trial
would begin on September 5th and end on September 8th. However, on
September 8th, in a 180-degree turn, the majority reversed the earlier
full bench ruling on the grounds that because the 14-day period for the
hearing of the petition had expired on September 2nd, the court did not
have jurisdiction to continue the proceedings.
It follows from the observations made above that the call by Justices
Chibomba and Munalula for the extension of the time in this particular
petition would have been more persuasive if they had based that call on
the fact that the Court did not properly conduct itself, and had failed
to ensure that the constitutional mandate to actually have a hearing was
complied with. This is especially so in light of the fact that the extension of
time was agreed to by all the judges of the Constitutional Court on Friday
the 2nd of September, and then mysteriously reversed two days later.
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Speedy resolution versus fair hearing
Justice Munalula brought out the competing interests behind the
‘technicality’ that call for careful balancing. She wrote that although
the framers of the Zambian Constitution were interested in the
speedy resolution of Presidential election petitions, that interest must
be tempered by the constitutional need to actually have a hearing.
Justice Munalula was right in extrapolating the tension between speedy
resolution and actual hearing, but failed to justify why the Court should
have tipped the balance in favour of having a hearing, and away from
speedy resolution, especially since she blamed the petitioners’ for time
wasting. Condemning the petitioner’s time-wasting motions, on the one
hand, and arguing for an extension of the time for the hearing, on the
other, seems inconsistent.
The underlying issue
In closing her dissenting opinion, Justice Munalula made a perceptive
observation. She said that neither party to the electoral dispute trusted
the Court to do the right thing. “If we as a country want to develop
constitutionalism in this country we need to begin to trust the institutions
and the persons in those institutions,” she held.
Assuming that Munalula was correct in observing that neither party
trusted the Court, then the inevitable outcome is that the Court’s
decision was bound to be rejected. In other words, rejection of the Court’s
adjudication would be automatic and 100% guaranteed to happen. It is a
classic case of ‘damned if you do, damned if you don’t’.
In the final analysis, the lack of trust of the court, from either party,
though not visible on the surface, appears to be underlying problem in
this whole matter and it accounts for the conduct of the petitioners’ legal
representatives inside the courtroom.
This underlying problem however, is one that the Constitution addresses
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indirectly: It requires that the Court be impartial and procedurally fair.
In this case, any impression of impartiality was dashed by the Court’s
conduct that culminated in the weekend meeting to overturn the full
bench decision of the court on the night of September 2.
Conclusion
It is not easy for a court to make a decision on a deeply polarizing and
acrimonious issue, especially when election results are as close as those
of the 2016 Zambian Presidential elections. This difficulty is made worse
if neither party to the dispute trusts the Court. In such circumstances,
whatever the outcome of a court’s deliberations, it is certain to be
perceived as biased.
It is clear that the Constitutional Court of Zambia failed to bring sanity
to what was a chaotic process. Litigation in Zambia is judge-driven,
and the Court has a duty to control the courtroom and the proceedings
therein. The flip-flopping of court directions worsened the situation and
apparently caught Justices Chibomba and Munalula off guard, putting
them in the embarrassing position of writing a rushed judgment. The
rushed judgment may also explain why, unlike the majority judgment,
none of the dissenting opinions directly spoke to the question of whether
the Court had jurisdiction to hear the petition after the expiry of the 14day period, although this was a question expressly raised as a preliminary
objection by the Attorney-General.
In the end, the court’s behaviour left commentators and observers
with an acute sense that something had gone terribly wrong in the
Constitutional Court. If parties have to comply with a 14-day time frame,
then the Court’s directions and proceedings should have been organised
accordingly, as the Kenyan Supreme Court did in its conduct of the 2013
Presidential petition before it. The judges of the Zambian Constitutional
Court were of one mind in condemning the behaviour of the petitioners’
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lawyers, who questioned the Court’s impartiality. Nonetheless, in view
of the unsatisfactory conduct of the proceedings by the Court, the Court
should have taken a more introspective, if not critical view of their own
conduct.

26

